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[Jaegwon Kim's "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism" Consciousness \u0026 Mental Causation \(Frank Jackson\)](#)

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[Mental Causation Consciousness, Emergence, \u0026 Mental Causation \(David Papineau\) Peter Tse The neural Causation PHI 331, Philosophy of Psychology, FA 2020 04. The Physicalist View of Minds Panpsychism \u2013 Peter Sj\u00f6stedt-H On Scientific Evidence for Mental Physical Causation Keith Ward 23 - Substance Dualism and Mental Causation The Mary Argument Against Physicalism \(Philosophy of Mind\) David Chalmers: What are the Problems of Physicalism? The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism \(Jackson "What Mary Didn't Know"\)](#)

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[Consciousness \u0026 Physicalism](#)

[3.2. INTROPHIL - Physicalism Identity Theory and Functionalism](#)

[How to Keep the Nonreductive in Nonreductive Physicalism Physicalism And Mental Causation The](#)

[Causal Exclusion Counter-Argument. Causal exclusion is only a problem for mental causation if you are an advocate for physicalism.](#)

Jaegwon Kim's causal exclusion argument states that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes (Kallestrup 2006).

[Problem of mental causation - Wikipedia](#)

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Giving an account of mental causation has been, for the past three decades, one of the main preoccupations of philosophers of mind who are committed to physicalism in one form or another. The problem, of course, is not new: As every student of western philosophy knows, Descartes, who arguably invented the mind-body problem, was confronted forcefully by his contemporaries on this issue.

[Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body ...](#)

Book Description: Physicalism—the thesis that everything there is in the world, including our minds, is constituted by basic physical entities—has dominated the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. But although the conceptual foundations of the physicalist agenda—including a proper explication of notions such as “causation”, “determination”, “realization” or even “physicalism” itself—must be settled before more specific problems (e.g. the problems of mental ...

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Physicalism and mental causation (Part I) Debate by Death Monkey (Philosophy Forum) [Quote by Minty] I read that the original motivation for materialism was a need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. So if a decision is identical to some process in the brain, then mental causation can be said to exist.

[Physicalism and mental causation - pages.uoregon.edu](#)

Focusing on the mental-to-physical cases, Kroedel explores what various views in contemporary metaphysics of mind imply about the possibility of mental causation. Mental causation -- in particular causation of physical effects by mental causes -- is often taken to be problematic, or even mysterious, especially if one takes the putative mental causes to be non-physical entities of some sort.

[Mental Causation: A Counterfactual Theory // Reviews ...](#)

Physicalism and Mental Causation Paperback \u2013 June 1, 2003 by Sven Walter (Editor), Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (Editor) 4.0 out of 5 stars 1 rating. See all formats and editions Hide other formats and editions. Price New from Used from Hardcover "Please retry" \$58.00 . \$58.00 \u2013 Paperback "Please retry" \$29.90 . \$27.91:

[Physicalism and Mental Causation: Walter, Sven, Heckmann ...](#)

Questions about the existence and nature of mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how an immaterial mind, a soul, could interact with the body. ... 2003, Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action ...

[Mental Causation \(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\)](#)

Mental causation: The mind and the body causally interact \u2013 thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, bring about bodily actions. Spatial location: Wherever there is causation, the cause and its effect must have spatial location. Dualism: The mind has no spatial location \u2013 there is no spatial location to thoughts, feelings, or perceptions.

[Causation, Mental | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)

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3.2 Nonreductive physicalism and mental causation. The causal argument's conclusion that mental events are identical with physical events entails that mental properties are identical with physical properties if we hold with Kim (1993: 33–52) that events just are property exemplifications.

[Physicalism | Analysis | Oxford Academic](#)

This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors in the field What people are saying...

[Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind ...](#)

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Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. Markus E. Schlosser - 2009 - In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain . Ontos.

[Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann \(eds.\). Physicalism ...](#)

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there is genuine mental causation only if some mental events have physical effects. But mental-to-physical causation leads to the following well-known problem for non-reductive physicalism. If mental events cause physical events, then they merely overdetermine their effects due to the causal closure of the physical.

Physicalism—the thesis that everything there is in the world, including our minds, is constituted by basic physical entities—has dominated the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. But although the conceptual foundations of the physicalist agenda—including a proper explication of notions such as “causation”, “determination”, “realization” or even “physicalism” itself—must be settled before more specific problems (e.g. the problems of mental causation and human agency) can be satisfactorily addressed, a comprehensive philosophical reflection on the relationships between the various key concepts of the debate on physicalism is yet missing. This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors in the field.

Presents a comprehensive account of how the mind causes things to happen in the physical world. This book is also available as Open Access.

This book lies at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion and operates on the assumption that dialogue between the two disciplines can be fruitful. In particular it focuses on how debates in the philosophy of mind regarding the nature of mental causation relate to debates in the philosophy of religion regarding divine action, creaturely causation, and existence of God. The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with Jaegwon Kim's so-called Supervenience Argument (SA) against non-reductive physicalism. One important observation is that the structural similarities between non-reductive physicalism and “orthodox” theism make it convenient to co-opt non-reductive physicalist solutions to the SA in defending the possibility of creaturely causation in the philosophy of religion. The SA is used as a foil to discuss the relative merits of Malebranche's so-called Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument for Occasionalism (CCCA). Moreover, the so-called compatibilist strategy (Karen Bennett 2003, 2009) for developing a non-reductive physicalist response to the Supervenience Argument is defended and developed. This strategy is then deployed in the philosophy of religion to defend the possibility of creaturely causation against the CCCA.

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or “how much”) physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible? The book's starting point is the “supervenience” argument (sometimes called the “exclusion” argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation. Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences (“qualia”). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost. According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.

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Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms questions the internal consistency of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental causation.

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.

An international team of contributors presents new work on the importance of ontology for a central debate in philosophy of mind. Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles--the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination--which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter's lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to have reached something of an impasse, prompting the question of why this should be so. One possibility is that, while this debate makes extensive use of ontological vocabulary--by talking, for instance, of substances, events, states, properties, powers, and relations--relatively little attempt has been made within the debate itself to achieve either clarity or agreement about what, precisely, such terms should be taken to mean. The debate has become somewhat detached from broader developments in metaphysics and ontology, which have lately been proceeding apace, providing us with an increasingly rich and refined set of ontological categories upon which to draw, as well as a much deeper understanding of how they are related to one another. In this volume, leading metaphysicians and philosophers of mind reflect afresh upon the problem of mental causation in the light of some of these recent developments, with a view to making new headway with one of the most challenging and seemingly intractable issues in contemporary philosophy.

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